Date when decision was rendered: 30.8.1996

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 3195; R-95/1455

Reference to source

KKO 1996:101.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 1996 II July-December

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 1996 II juli-december

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 1996 II heinä-joulukuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: The Supreme Court

Date of publication: 1997

Pages: pp.518-520

Subject

fair trial, pretrial investigation, right to remain silent,
rättvis rättegång, förundersökning, rätt att avstå från att yttra sig,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, esitutkinta, oikeus pysyä vaiti,

Relevant legal provisions

Section 58 of the Road Traffic Act

= vägtrafiklagen 58 §

= tieliikennelaki 58 §.

ECHR-6-2, CCPR-14-3-g

Abstract

Section 58 of the Road Traffic Act obliges every driver involved in a traffic accident to stop and assist the injured.A had been involved in a traffic accident but neglected his obligations under section 58 of the Road Traffic Act.He claimed that he could not be punished for neglecting his obligations as stopping and assisting the injured at the scene of the accident would have placed him in a position where he himself could have been arrested and charged with drunken driving, among other things.This would violate A's right not to incriminate himself, which can be derived from the ECHR.

The Supreme Court stated that it does not follow from obeying section 58 of the Road Traffic Act that a crime suspect involved in a traffic accident would not have the same rights as everyone charged with a criminal offence is entitled to according to Article 14-3-g of the CCPR and Article 6-2 of the ECHR.A was sentenced for neglecting his obligations under section 58 of the Road Traffic Act.

Both the court of first instance and the court of appeal came to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court.The reasoning behind the decision of the court of first instance was the purpose of section 58 of the Road Traffic Act, which is to protect the life and health of victims of traffic accidents and which also contributes to the realisation of human rights.

30.3.1998 / 1.4.2003 / LISNELLM

Date when decision was rendered: 22.3.2004

Judicial body: Supreme Court = Högsta domstolen = Korkein oikeus

Reference: Report No. 630; R2002/366

Reference to source

KKO 2004:24.

Decisions of the Supreme Court 2004 I January-June

Avgöranden av Högsta domstolen 2004 I januari-juni

Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisuja 2004 I tammi-kesäkuu

Place of publication: Helsinki

Publisher: Edita

Date of publication: 2004

Pages: 150-158

Subject

fair trial, right to remain silent,
rättvis rättegång, rätt att avstå från att yttra sig,
oikeudenmukainen oikeudenkäynti, oikeus pysyä vaiti,

Relevant legal provisions

Chapter 32, section 1 of the Penal Code; Chapter 17, section 5 of the Code of Judicial Procedure

= strafflagen 32 kapitel 1 §; rättegångsbalken 17 kapitel 5 §

= rikoslaki 32 luku 1 §; oikeudenkäymiskaari 17 luku 5 §.

ECHR-6

Abstract

A was charged for having sold large amounts of goods which had allegedly been stolen.A denied that the goods had been gained through an offence but did not wish to clarify how he had obtained them.In A's opinion, it had not been shown that the goods had been stolen and therefore he could not be charged with concealment of illegally obtained goods.In its decision the Supreme Court referred to the Code of Judicial Procedure and quoted also the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of John Murray v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 8 February 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-I) and Averill v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 6 June 2000, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2000-VI).The Supreme Court pointed out that the right to remain silent lays at the heart of the right to a fair trial.The accused has no duty to contribute to the clarification of the case against him or her.The court may consider what effect the accused's silence has as evidence, but a conviction cannot be solely or mainly based on the accused's silence or a refusal to answer questions.However, the right to remain silent cannot or should not prevent the accused's silence, in situations which clearly call for an explanation from him or her, from being taken into account when assessing the persuasiveness of the evidence adduced by the prosecution.The Supreme Court concluded that, considering the evidence as a whole, the possibility had been excluded that A could have obtained the goods by any other means than through an offence.A had not presented any evidence against this conclusion, though he would have had the possibility to do so.The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts and considered that A could be charged with the concealment and resale of illegally obtained goods.

22.4.2005 / 22.4.2005 / ASADINMA